Why climate migrations are closely linked to "Water and Politics"?

    Hello! 

    After having tackled the issue of the very political financing of water infrastructures in Africa, we are going to reflect today on the legal status of climate refugees. I chose to focus on this topic because it also intersects with environmental change. Moreover, the notion of "climate refugee" was unclear to me and I thought it was crucial to clarify it as COP 26 approaches. 

    According to a report published by UC Berkeley's Othering & Belonging Institute (2019), "Ethiopia accounts for less than 1 percent of total global CO2 emissions, but it faces particularly intense effects of the climate crisis." For example, "in 2015, Ethiopia experienced one of its worst droughts in 50 years due to the failure of two consecutive rainy seasons. This drought led to increased food insecurity and the displacement of 280,000 people" (p. 22). The fact that the countries that have contributed the least to climate change and that are the most economically disadvantaged suffer the most from the consequences of the greenhouse gas emissions of the developed countries seemed to me to be deeply unfair. 

    How do we call these displaced people? First and foremost, the "climate refugee" definition  is unclear, as its legal protection, as we will see later. However, according to the same report, climate refugees are "individuals who are forcibly displaced (within or beyond the borders of their nation-state) by short- and long-term natural disasters and by environmental degradation precipitated or exacerbated by the climate crisis" (p.2). According to a World Bank report cited in this article by Laura Parker for National Geographic, 143 million people may soon become climate refugees. Still according to this article and as the map below (Othering & Belonging Institute, 2019, p.33) also shows it, most of this climate change will take place in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Latin America and could therefore affect 55% of the developing world population. 

    But eventually, why looking into the "climate refugees" question is pertinent in this blog? In fact, to understand it, it is fundamental to be aware of the issue of water and the natural disasters associated that become more and more frequent due to climate change. The title of Randall Hackley's article How Water Scarcity Shapes the World's Refugee Crisis (EcoWatch, 2018) leaves no doubt about the relevance of our questioning of the causal links between water disasters and the displacement of the growing number of climate refugees. According to Ibrahim Thiaw, Executive Secretary of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, "there is a correlation between the level of desertification and the number of migrants, especially in the Sahel". A study by Climate Central shows that around 300 million people will be vulnerable to annual flooding by 2050, potentially reaching 480 million by 2100 (Delgado, 2020). Similarly, at least 25% of the planet will experience serious drought and desertification within three decades if attempts by the Paris agreement to curb global warming aren’t met (EcoWatch, 2018). These floods and droughts in prospect augur poor harvests, water shortages and increasingly difficult access to safe drinking water. All these natural disasters more severe and frequent now than ever and especially the rise of the sea level make whole territories uninhabitable and threatened to be submerged. If you're interested, I urge you to read Randall Hackley's article previously quoted that explains in more detail the reasons why climate refugees move in search of viable land. 

    Having explained the link between climate refugees and water, let us now turn to the political implications of these displacements. To what extent does the climate refugee have a status? Are they recognized and protected? The "climate refugee" does not meet the refugee definition given by the 1951 Geneva Convention, which links refugee status to the existence of "persecution" and the necessary crossing of a border (Le Priol, 2019). However, the “actors” of persecution are fundamentally indeterminable (Othering & Belonging Institute, 2019). A new understanding of “persecution” is therefore absolutely required as much as a new legally binding, multilateral agreement to answer to climate migration. Indeed, the Nansen Initiative, adopted in 2015, aims to fill the legal gap around environmental displacement but has no binding force (World Bank, 2018). Similarly, the UN judgement recognizes without constrain the right to seek asylum due to the climate crisis, emphasizing that countries have a legal responsibility to protect climate refugees and that deporting these people would violate their right to life (Delgado, 2020). Therefore, states are prohibited under international law (articles 6 and 8 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which secures a person’s right to life) from sending climate refugees back to their home countries (Godin, 2020).

    After having better understood the ins and outs of climate migration, what recommendation could we make to better protect these climate migrants who have everything of refugees except the status and the associated protection? Our main recommendation may be the creation of a new refugee convention, the Convention relating to the Status of Climate Refugees, or the amendment of the 1951 Refugee Convention. It must do so without the need to identify a specific polluter or industrial process as the source of such “persecution” thus allowing climate refugees to formally make a claim for asylum in a country of their choosing (Othering & Belonging Institute, 2019). 

    I hope you enjoyed reading my post and that it made you want to learn more about climate migration and how this issue fits perfectly into the Water and Politics theme of my blog. To go further, I invite you to take a look at the diagram below (Othering & Belonging Institute, 2019, p.6) which explains the other factors that explain the displacement of climate refugees.